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COMMENTS
TAKING THE NARROW PATH TO THE
WATERFALL: DEFENDING THE USE OF
MEDICAL CANNABIS AFTER UNITED STATES V.
OAKLAND CANNABIS BUYERS' COOPERATIVE
Bart Volkmer*
I. INTRODUCTION
Terminally and chronically ill people in the United States
continue to use medical cannabis despite unprecedented
numbers of arrests for marijuana possession and distribu-
tion.' In the form of voter propositions and legislative bills,
states are now beginning to approve the use of cannabis for
medical purposes.2
The Federal Government, however, has not followed suit.
In California, the Federal Government's response to state-
sponsored sanctioning of medical cannabis use has taken
three forms: (1) criminally prosecuting users and distribu-
tors;3 (2) seeking civil injunctions against clubs that distribute
* Articles Editor, Santa Clara Law Review, Volume 42. J.D. candidate,
Santa Clara University School of Law; B.A. Creighton University.
1. See Jefferson M. Fish, Conference: Is Our Drug Policy Effective? Are
There Alternatives?, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 3, 117 (2000) (noting that although
the number of arrests on marijuana charges has been increasing, patients are
continuing to use marijuana for medicinal purposes).
2. California, Arizona, Alaska, Colorado, Oregon and Washington cur-
rently have some form of medical marijuana law on the books. See CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West Supp. 2002); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §
13-3412.01 (West 2001); ALASKA STAT. § 11-71-090 (Michie 2000); COLO. CONST.
ART. XVIII, § 14 (2001); OR. REV. STAT. § 37-475.309 (1999); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 69.51A.005 (West Supp. 2002).
3. See Andrew J. Levay, Note, Urgent Compassion: Medical Marijuana,
Prosecutorial Discretion and the Medical Necessity Defense, 41 B.C. L. REV. 699,
726-35 (2000).
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cannabis to the terminally ill;4 and (3) threatening sanctions
against doctors who recommend the medical use of cannabis.'
Clearly, the will of the states is clashing with the will of the
federal government in this area. Some commentators have
suggested that those who defend the use of medical cannabis
should raise constitutionally-based challenges, such as claims
based on the Commerce or the Tenth Amendment.6
As background for examining the viability of the Com-
merce Clause challenge, Part II of this comment discusses the
current medical marijuana jurisprudence, including the re-
cent decision United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Co-
operative,7 the Controlled Substances Act, the Commerce
Clause, the equity power of district courts and the Tenth
Amendment.' Part III identifies the medical marijuana is-
sues left unanswered by Oakland Cannabis.9 The pitfalls of
using a traditional Commerce Clause analysis to challenge
drug laws and the most promising Commerce Clause argu-
ments are highlighted in Part IV. Part IV also applies the
principles of the Supreme Court's Commerce Clause rulings
to the medical cannabis debate and analyzes the equity pow-
ers of district courts after Oakland Cannabis." This comment
shows that when the government seeks injunctive relief to
close medical cannabis clubs, an opportunity arises for argu-
ments in favor of continued medical cannabis use. Part V
proposes that those faced with injunctions for dispensing
medical cannabis should take advantage of the equitable
powers of the court by arguing that injunctive relief is not the
proper method for enforcement of the Controlled Substances
4. See United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop., 121 S. Ct. 1711,
1722 (2001) (holding that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals erred when re-
manding an injunction request to the District Court with instructions to allow a
medical necessity exemption to the Controlled Substances Act).
5. See Conant v. McCaffrey, No. C 97-00139 WHA, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
13024, at *1. (N.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 2000) (enjoining the government from revoking
DEA registration of a physician who recommends marijuana pursuant to Cali-
fornia's Medical Marijuana Act, Proposition 215).
6. See Allister E. Newbern, Comment, Good Cop, Bad Cop: Federal Prose-
cution of State-Legalized Medical Marijuana Use After United States v. Lopez,
88 CAL. L. REV. 1575 (2000).
7. 121 S. Ct. 1711 (2001).
8. See infra Part II.
9. See infra Part III.
10. See infra Part IV.
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Act ("CSA") in the medical cannabis context." Last, this
comment argues that the Tenth Amendment acts as a limit to
Congress's commerce power when it seeks to criminalize non-
economic behavior expressly permitted by the states."
II. BACKGROUND
A. The United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers'
Cooperative Case
Oakland Cannabis is the only Supreme Court decision
that has addressed the issue of medical marijuana. Accord-
ingly, future medical marijuana litigation will proceed
against its backdrop.
1. The Facts of Oakland Cannabis
The Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Cooperative ("OCBC") is
a nonprofit organization that distributed marijuana to its pa-
tients." In order to become a member of the OCBC, patients
had to submit a written statement from a doctor approving
the patient's use of marijuana for medical purposes. 4 The
OCBC also required potential patients to sit for a screening
interview." Once a member of the organization, patients
were given identification cards entitling them to receive mari-
juana from the OCBC.1" The cooperative operated pursuant
to the authority of California's Proposition 215, which creates
an exception to state laws prohibiting marijuana cultivation
and possession when the marijuana is being used for medical
purposes at the recommendation of a doctor."
2. Procedural History
In January 1998, the United States sued the OCBC in
federal district court seeking to enjoin the cooperative from
distributing and manufacturing marijuana. 8 Even though
11. See infra Part V.
12. See infra Part V.A-B.





17. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West Supp. 2002).
18. See Oakland Cannabis, 121 S. Ct. at 1715-16.
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the activities of the OCBC did not necessarily violate Califor-
nia law, the United States maintained that distribution of
marijuana for medical purposes nonetheless violated the fed-
eral CSA. 9 The district court agreed with the government
and granted a preliminary injunction.2 The OCBC petitioned
the district court to modify the injunction to allow for the dis-
tribution of marijuana to a limited number of patients whose
marijuana use was medically necessary for relief from pain
and suffering.2' The district court denied this petition.22
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed
the district court's denial of the modification petition." The
court of appeals ruled that the defense of medical necessity
was "legally cognizable" and would likely apply under the cir-
cumstances of the case.24 The Ninth Circuit remanded the
case instructing the district court to consider the medical ne-
cessity defense when modifying the injunction.2
3. Holding
The Supreme Court held that medical necessity is not a
defense to manufacturing and distributing marijuana.26  Ac-
cordingly, the Court held that the Ninth Circuit erred when
instructing the district court to modify its injunction to in-
clude a medical necessity defense.27 After Oakland Cannabis,
defenders of medical marijuana are thereby prevented from
using the common law defense of necessity.2






25. See id. The Ninth Circuit specifically instructed the district court
to reconsider the appellants' request for a modification that would ex-
empt from the injunction distribution to seriously ill individuals who
need cannabis for medical purposes. In particular, the district court is
instructed to consider ... criteria for a medical necessity exemption,
and, should it modify the injunction, to set forth those criteria in the
modification order.
United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop., 190 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir.
1999), rev'd, 121 S. Ct. 1711 (2001).
26. See Oakland Cannabis, 121 S. Ct. at 1719.
27. Id. at 1722.
28. As Justice Stevens points out in the concurrence, the holding of Oakland
Cannabis is technically limited to the necessity defense as applied to the distri-
bution and manufacture of marijuana. See id. at 1722 (Stevens, J., concurring).




Although the CSA does not explicitly abrogate a necessity
defense, the Court reasoned that the necessity defense is not
available when the legislature has already made a determi-
nation of the values regarding the behavior that is claimed to
be necessary.29 With regard to a medical necessity defense to
the CSA, the Court determined that Congress had already
made a determination that marijuana has "no currently ac-
cepted medical use," and therefore a medical necessity de-
fense was unavailable.0 The Court reasoned that the struc-
ture of the Act supports this reading because marijuana is
placed in the most restrictive category of controlled sub-
stances. 1
In Oakland Cannabis, defendants urged the Supreme
Court to affirm the Ninth Circuit based on the equity powers
of the district courts.32 The OCBC argued that courts sitting
in equity have broad powers to fashion equitable relief based
on the public interest, irrespective of the legal defenses avail-
able.33 The Court initially noted that district courts, when sit-
ting in equity, have discretion to refuse to issue an injunction
absent a clear command in the statute to the contrary.34 The
Court stated that this is also true with regard to the Con-
trolled Substances Act, noting that "Congress' resolution of
the policy issues can be (and usually is) upheld without an in-
junction."35
The Court found, however, that the district courts should
not consider all factors relating to public interest.36 The
Court determined that the choice of a district court "is simply
whether a particular means of enforcing the statute should be
chosen over another permissible means; their choice is not
the necessity defense would also not be available to a defendant charged with
possession of a controlled substance. See id. at 1719 n.7 ("Lest there be any con-
fusion, we clarify that nothing in our analysis, or the statute, suggests that a
distinction should be drawn between the prohibitions on manufacturing and
distributing and the other prohibitions in the Controlled Substances Act.").
29. See id. at 1718.
30. See id.
31. See id. C
32. See id. at 1720.
33. See id.
34. See id. at 1720-21.
35. See id. at 1721.
36. See id. at 1721.
93320021
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whether enforcement is preferable to no enforcement at all." 7
Consequently, when a court of equity exercises its discretion,
"it may not consider the advantages and disadvantages of
nonenforcement of the statute, but only the advantages and
disadvantages of 'employing the extraordinary remedy of in-
junction,' over the other available methods of enforcement."38
Although the Court held that the Ninth Circuit erred in
instructing the district court to modify its injunction to in-
clude a necessity exemption, Justice Thomas' majority opin-
ion recognized the flexible equitable powers of district
courts.39 In this ruling, the Court did not reach constitutional
issues because the lower courts did not address them.4"
B. The Controlled Substances Act
A growing number of states have passed voter proposi-
tions that allow the medical use of cannabis.41 Title II of the
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of
1970, commonly known as the Controlled Substances Act,
("CSA"),4" stands at odds with these propositions.43 The CSA
uses five schedules to classify controlled substances.44 Con-
gress placed marijuana on Schedule I, which is reserved for
drugs with a high potential for abuse, no currently accepted
medical use in the United States, and a lacking acceptable
37. Id. at 1721.
38. Id. at 1722 (citation omitted).
39. "Although district courts whose equity powers have been properly in-
voked indeed have discretion in fashioning injunctive relief (in the absence of a
statutory restriction), the Court of Appeals erred concerning the factors that the
district courts may consider in exercising such discretion." Id. at 1720. In Oak-
land Cannabis, the district court, in exercising its equitable discretion, had
originally granted the government's § 882 injunction request. See id. at 1716.
On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, the court ruled that the district court abused its
discretion in not contemplating the public interest and granting defendants' pe-
tition to modify the injunction to include a medical necessity defense. See id.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court was only ruling on whether or not the Appeals
Court properly determined that the District Court abused its discretion. Id.
40. See Oakland Cannabis, 121 S. Ct. at 1719 ("Nor do we consider the un-
derlying constitutional issues today. Because the Court of Appeals did not ad-
dress these claims, we decline to do so in the first instance.").
41. See supra note 2.
42. See Pub. L. No. 91-513, tit. II, 84 Stat. 1242 (codified as amended at 21
U.S.C. §§ 801-971 (2000)).
43. The CSA does not provide an exemption for medical marijuana use.
However, an exemption does exist for government-supervised research. See 21
U.S.C. § 823(M.
44. See id. § 812(a).
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45levels of safety when used under medical supervision. When
state voters determine the legality of medical cannabis under
state law, the declaration traditionally does not affect the en-
forceability of federal statutes because of the broad interpre-
tation of the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution."
The statute contains a civil remedy provision that allows
the Federal Government to petition district courts to enjoin
violations of the CSA.47 The Federal Government has only in-
voked § 882 in three reported decisions, including Oakland
Cannabis.48 In United States v. Williams, the defendant
pharmacist failed to maintain distribution records for pre-
scription drugs and filled incomplete, photocopied, and forged
prescriptions for his own profit. 9 The court ordered the de-
fendant to maintain accurate records and inventories and to
cease and desist from filling illegal prescriptions. ° The dis-
trict court also assessed civil penalties.5 '
United States v. 121 Nostrand Avenue is another case
where the Government invoked § 882.2 In that case, the
Government seized property connected to drug dealing. 3 The
court only briefly discussed § 882 in the opinion:
The Government requests an injunction prohibiting the
claimants or other occupants from using the apartment to
commit or facilitate narcotics offenses. Such an injunction
45. Id. § 812(b). The definition of a Schedule I drug lies at the heart of the
medical marijuana debate since proponents steadfastly claim that marijuana
indeed has medicinal qualities. The definition states that a drug must have no
currently accepted medical use in the United States. See id. This definition
seems to leave open the possibility that these substances could, at a later date,
be found to indeed have a legitimate medical use. However, once placed on
Schedule I, doctors are not allowed to prescribe the substance to patients, thus
the label "no currently accepted medical use in the United States" remains per-
manent. Id. § 828. The definition of a Schedule I drug at first blush appears
dynamic, but is in reality static.
46. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL, LAW 4 (1997) ("Practically,
the effect of the Supremacy Clause is that the state and local laws are deemed
preempted if they conflict with federal law.").
47. 21 U.S.C. § 882(a).
48. United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop., 121 S. Ct.. 1711
(2001); United States v. 121 Nostrand Ave., 760 F. Supp. 1015 (E.D.N.Y. 1991);
United States v. Williams, 416 F. Supp. 611 (D.D.C. 1976).
49. See Williams, 416 F. Supp. at 612-14.
50. See id. at 614.
51. See id.
52. See 121 Nostrand Ave., 760 F. Supp. (enjoining future distribution of il-
licit drugs at a public housing unit).
53. See id.
93520021
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is authorized by [§ 882]. How such an injunction can be
enforced apart from state and federal criminal statutes is
not clear. The statute arguably provides for an injunction.
The Government has established the prerequisites for ob-
taining an injunction. The injunction is granted.54
121 Nostrand Avenue dealt with the sale of crack cocaine at a
public housing unit.5 The defendants did not submit any evi-
dence encouraging the court to refrain from issuing the in-
junction.56
C. The Commerce Clause
The Commerce Clause is relevant to the current medical
marijuana debate because the Court in Oakland Cannabis
did not address the issue of whether Congress exceeded its
Commerce power when enacting the CSA.7 In 1937, Con-
gress' power to enact laws pursuant to the Commerce Clause
was effectively turned on its head.58 In NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., the Supreme Court upheld a federal la-
bor law, which appeared to affect purely local activities." On
its face, this decision appeared unremarkable; Jones &
Laughlin Steel was a huge steel corporation engaged in inter-
state commerce. 9 The aftermath of the Jones & Laughlin de-
cision, however, is remarkable: For fifty-eight years, not a
single law was declared unconstitutional as exceeding the
scope of Congress's commerce power.61 In essence, the courts
gave Congress carte blanche when claiming the Commerce
Clause as a source of power behind a law.
The Supreme Court case of Wickard v. Filburn further
expanded Congress's power under the Commerce Clause." In
54. Id. at 1035 (citation omitted).
55. See id. at 1024.
56. See id. at 1033.
57. See supra note 40.
58. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (holding
that the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 was a constitutionally permissive
expression of Congress' commerce power because the intrastate activity in ques-
tion had a substantial effect on interstate commerce).
59. See id. at 49.
60. See id. at 20.
61. Until 1995, the judiciary remained deferential to laws passed pursuant
to Congress' commerce power. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
62. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (holding that the Agricul-
tural Adjustment Act of 1938 was constitutional even as applied to purely intra-
state sustenance wheat production).
[Vol. 42
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Wickard, a wheat farmer sued the government to enjoin a
quota system that penalized him for growing wheat in excess
of the quota.63 Even though his wheat crop was grown solely
for personal consumption on his Ohio farm, the Court still
held that Congress had the power to regulate this activity.64
The court noted: "Home-grown wheat in this sense competes
with wheat in commerce. The stimulation of commerce is a
use of the regulatory function quite as definitely as prohibi-
tions or restrictions thereon."6 Although the wheat in ques-
tion was not a thing in interstate commerce, the "aggregate
effects" of the home consumption of the wheat did have an ef-
fect on the over-all market for wheat nationwide and was
thus a proper subject of Congressional regulation.66
In 1995, Commerce Clause jurisprudence again under-
went a major revision. In United States v. Lopez, the Su-
preme Court declared the Gun Free School Zones Act of 1990
("GFSZA") unconstitutional. Chief Justice Rehnquist's ma-
jority opinion recognized that Congress may enact legislation
under the Commerce Clause if the law: (1) regulates the
channels of interstate commerce; (2) regulates the instrumen-
talities of interstate commerce (i.e., the regulation of persons
and things in interstate commerce); or (3) deals sufficiently
with commerce in a way that substantially affects interstate
68
commerce.
With respect to the third category, the court further re-
fined the analysis by first examining whether the regulated
activity was economic and substantially affecting interstate
commerce.69 If so, the law would be sustained.0 Second, the
court examined the law for the presence of an express juris-
dictional element, limiting the subject matter of the law to
things actually in interstate commerce.7 Third, the Court
analyzed whether Congress had made express findings show-
ing that the activity in question did in fact substantially af-
63. See id. at 113.
64. See id. at 128-29.
65. Id. at 128.
66. See id.
67. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567-68 (1995).
68. See id. at 558-59.
69. See id. at 559-60.
70. See id. at 560.
71. See id. at 561-62.
20021 937
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fect interstate commerce. 2  Fourth, the Court analyzed
whether the link between the regulated activity and inter-
state commerce was not attenuated. 3 The Lopez Court found
that the GFSZA possessed none of these elements. 4
The law in question federally criminalized possession of a
gun in a school zone." The Court noted that the GFSZA was
a criminal law, not an economic law,"6 and that the law was
not limited to guns that were actually in interstate commerce,
as defined by a jurisdictional element." Therefore, the law
could not be said to affect interstate commerce in a way that
would save its constitutionality."8 The Court's ruling notes
that laws dealing with economic regulation would still be ac-
corded deference," while laws proscribing activities relating
to violent behavior would receive closer scrutiny-"°
The Court rejected the Government's argument that pos-
session of a gun in a school zone substantially affects inter-
state commerce because the costs of violent crime are spread
through the nation by increased insurance costs," and be-
cause violent crime discourages interstate travel." The Court
found that these arguments were overbroad, and if followed
would give the Federal Government a national police power
over all violent crime."3 Such a broad interpretation would
over-step the Article I powers of Congress. On a practical
level, it is important to note that the GFSZA was passed in
1990 and overturned only five years later; the executive
branch had not installed an agency to enforce this law. 4 With
72. See id. at 562.
73. See id. at 563-64.
74. The court ruled that the GFZSA did not contain a jurisdictional element,
that it was not supported by Congressional findings on how the regulated activ-
ity affects interstate commerce, and that it was not regulating an activity that
had a substantial effect on interstate commerce. See id. at 562.
75. See id. at 551.
76. See id. at 561.
77. See id.
78. See id. at 567.
79. "Even Wickard, which is perhaps the most far reaching example of
Commerce Clause authority over intrastate activity, involved economic activity
in a way that the possession of a gun in a school zone does not." Id. at 560.
80. See id. at 561.
81. See id. at 563-64.
82. See id. at 564.
83. See id.
84. It is always important to recognize political realities. When the judici-
ary acquiesces to a law and the executive has been vigorously enforcing it, the
938 [Vol. 42
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the GFSZA, Congress boldly attempted to pass a federal
criminal statute with only a tenuous a link to commerce."
The practical realities of the GFSZA made it a clear target for
a federalism-centered court to reign in the power of Congress.
Some commentators feel this decision provides precedent to
challenge federal enforcement of the CSA against medical
cannabis providers.86
The second salvo in the Supreme Court's attempt to send
a message to Congress that it was willing to carefully scruti-
nize Commerce Clause legislation came in United States v.
Morrison.7 In Morrison, the Court examined the constitu-
tionality of a provision in the Violence Against Women Act of
199488 ("VAWA"), which gave plaintiffs a civil remedy of dam-
ages for gender-motivated crimes.89 The statute provided: "A
person.., who commits a crime of violence motivated by gen-
der and thus deprives another of the right [to be free from
crimes of violence] ... shall be liable to the party in-
jured ... ."" The Court ruled that the civil penalty provisions
of VAWA were unconstitutional because the activity the Act
addressed did not substantially affect interstate commerce.91
The Court recognized that the judiciary traditionally gives
Congress deference when analyzing the constitutionality of
laws passed pursuant to its Commerce Clause power.92 De-
spite this acknowledgment, the Court proceeded to hold that
the civil remedy provisions of VAWA exceeded the scope of
law becomes more difficult to invalidate from a practical standpoint.
85. See id. at 561.
86. "Plaintiffs seeking the ability to use medical marijuana without the
threat of federal prosecution must embrace [the] prospect that Lopez and its
progeny have given them and argue that Congress's regulatory power no longer
reaches state-legalized medical marijuana use." Newbern, supra note 6, at
1633.
87. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
88. Pub. L. 103-322, Title IV, 108 Stat. 1902 (codified in scattered sections
of 42 U.S.C.).
89. See 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (2000); Morrison, 529 U.S. at 668. It should be
noted that the GFSZA, struck down in Lopez, was a criminal statute, not a civil
one. The VAWA, however, did share a common element with the GFSZA: Both
statutes attempted to regulate violent activity. See id. at 675.
90. 42 U.S.C. § 13981.
91. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 676.
92. See id. at 669. The court speaks of a "presumption of constitutionality"
and notes that "[d]ue respect for the decisions of a coordinate branch of Gov-
ernment demands that we invalidate a congressional enactment only upon a
plain showing that Congress has exceeded its constitutional bounds." Id.
20021 939
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Congress's authority and therefore the Court declared it un-
constitutional.a
The Morrison Court began its analysis by making explicit
what was implicit in the Lopez decision: If the activity being
regulated involves economic activity, the old rules of defer-
ence still apply. The court noted that "Lopez's review of
Commerce Clause case law demonstrates that in those cases
where we have sustained federal regulation of intrastate ac-
tivity based upon the activity's substantial effects on inter-
state commerce, the activity in question has been some sort of
economic endeavor."
94
Using Lopez as a guide, the Court determined that the
VAWA provision did not in any way involve an economic ac-
tivity, and therefore an analysis of the aggregate effects of the
regulated activity on interstate commerce was inappropri-
ate.95 Further, the VAWA provision contained no jurisdic-
tional element.96 The provision was so far reaching that a
gender-motivated, violent crime between two life-long resi-
dents of a state would still have been covered by the Act.
Crimes covered under the Act might bear no relation to eco-
nomic activity. In this case, although Congress did provide
numerous findings supporting the proposition that gender
motivated crime had a substantial effect on interstate com-
merce,97 the Court still rejected the argument that Congress
had the authority to regulate noneconomic, violent criminal
conduct based only on the aggregate affect of that conduct on
interstate commerce. 9' The Court was concerned that the
statutes in question in both Lopez and Morrison dealt with
93. See id. at 676.
94. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 672. It can be tempting to over-generalize the
holdings in Lopez and Morrison. A more reasonable interpretation of the two
cases is that the holdings reach only non-economic activity. The Morrison court
noted: "a fair reading of Lopez shows that the non-economic, criminal nature of
the conduct at issue was central to our decision in that case." Id.
95. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 672. But note that the Court did not set forth
a "categorical rule against aggregating the effects of any non-economic activity."
Id at 673. Presumably the prohibition against aggregating in Morrison was lim-
ited to its particular facts: a federal statute attempting to regulate a traditional
matter of local police power.
96. See id. at 672. Congress could have added a jurisdictional element by
requiring the plaintiff to prove that the defendant crossed state lines to commit
the violent action.
97. See id. at 674-75.
98. Id. at 676.
940 [Vol. 42
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the suppression of violent crime and the vindication of its vic-
tims, deeming such regulation the clearest example of a
power vested in the states.99
The civil remedy provision of VAWA did not require a
federal executive bureaucracy to enforce violations of the Act
because Congress extended the VAWA remedy to private liti-
gants, not the Government.'00 As in Lopez, this statute was
struck down soon after its enactment.'01 Like the GFZSA, this
provision, from a practical standpoint, was ripe for the pluck-
ing.
In the case of United States v. Cannabis Cultivators Club,
a Commerce Clause challenge was raised as a defense to the
CSA.'O' Defendants, owners of cannabis clubs, argued that
since all of their activity was purely intrastate and since they
were not in the business of for-profit drug trafficking, the
CSA should not apply to them.0 3 The district court rejected
these arguments, noting that the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals had held in previous cases that the CSA is a valid ex-
pression of Congress's commerce power.' The court also
found unavailing defendants' argument that those cases were
inapposite because they were distributing cannabis for medi-
cal purposes and not for profit.' 5 The court noted that even
this type of distribution would have an effect on interstate
commerce.
06
D. The Equity Power of District Courts
When a federal provision explicitly authorizes injunctions
to enforce a statute, a question arises as to whether a district
court sitting in equity must issue an injunction when the
99. See id.
100. 42 U.S.C. § 13981(c) (2000). As in Lopez, this gave the Court a practical
reason to strike down the provision.
101. The VAWA was enacted in 1994. The Morrison case was decided in
2000. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 598.
102. See United States v. Cannabis Cultivators Club, 5 F. Supp. 2d 1086,
1096-98 (N.D. Cal. 1998).
103. See id.
104. See id. (citing United States v. Bramble, 103 F.3d 1475, 1479-80 (9th
Cir. 1996); United States v. Tisor, 96 F.3d 370, 373-75 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. de-
nied, 519 U.S. 1140 (1997); United States v. Kim, 94 F.3d 1247, 1249-50 (9th
Cir. 1996); and United States v. Staples, 85 F.3d 461, 463 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
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statute is violated. The first Supreme Court case to deal with
this issue was Hecht Co. v. Bowles.!°7 In Hecht, plaintiff, a
price administrator, brought an action to secure an injunction
against a department store pursuant to the Price Control Act
of 1942.108 The defendant had charged prices in violation of
the Price Control Act and failed to keep records pursuant to
the Act."°9 The district court refused to grant an injunction,
noting that the violations were not made in bad faith, the
problems were corrected, and the Hecht Company had coop-
erated with the government during the process."' The Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed, holding that
the injunction was mandatory once a violation was found."'
The Supreme Court later ruled that an injunction was not
mandatory in all circumstances and reversed the Court of
Appeals."'
The Hecht Court was dealing with a provision of the
Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 that provided: "upon a
showing.., that a person has engaged or is about to engage
in any such [violations of the price control statutes] ... a
permanent or temporary injunction shall be granted without
a bond.""' The language of the statute made an injunction
mandatory, not permissive, yet the Supreme Court held that
the district court still retained the power to decide whether or
not to issue the injunction because Congress had not shown
an intent to alter the equity powers of the court.14 The Court
noted that "[Tihe standards of the public interest, not the re-
quirements of private litigation, measure the propriety and
need for injunctive relief.""'
107. 321 U.S. 321 (1944).
108. See id. at 321-23; Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, 50 U.S.C. §§
901-946 (1946) (repealed 1947).
109. See Hecht, 321 U.S. at 324.
110. See id. at 325.
111. See id.
112. See id. at 330-31.
113. See id. at 321.
114. The Court stated that
A grant of jurisdiction to issue compliance orders hardly suggests an
absolute duty to do so under any and all circumstances. We cannot but
think that if Congress had intended to make such a drastic departure
from the traditions of equity practice, an unequivocal statement of its
purpose would have been made.
Id. at 329.
115. Id. at 331.
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In only one instance has the Supreme Court held that a
district court did not have the equitable discretion to refrain
from issuing an injunction. In Tennessee Valley Authority v.
Hill"6 ("TVA"), the Court ruled that an injunction must be is-
sued enjoining the building of a dam that would have admit-
tedly violated the Endangered Species Act."7  Justice
Rehnquist stated in his dissent:
Only by sharply retreating from the statutory principle of
construction announced in Hecht Co. could I agree with
the Court of Appeals' holding in this case that the judicial
enforcement provisions.., require automatic issuance of
an injunction once a violation is found. I choose to adhere
to Hecht Co.'s teaching .... Since the District Court pos-
sessed discretion to refuse injunctive relief even though it
had found a violation of the Act, the only remaining ques-
tion is whether discretion was abused in denying respon-
dents' prayer for an injunction."8
In TVA, suspending the building of the dam was the only
available remedy to ensure compliance with the Endangered
Species Act."9 In short, the court was faced with two options:
either allow the building of the dam by issuing the injunction
and sacrifice an endangered species, or prevent the comple-
tion of the dam and save the species.
E. The Tenth Amendment
The Tenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides:
"The powers not delegated to the United States by the Consti-
tution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
States respectively, or the people."2 ' Although some cases in
the 1980s ruled that this amendment does not act as a sub-
stantive limit on Congress's power, 2' recent Supreme Court
decisions demonstrate respect for state sovereignty as ex-
pressed in the amendment.
In New York v. United States, the Supreme Court ana-
lyzed the constitutionality of the Low-Level Radioactive
116. 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
117. See id. at 171-74.
118. Id. at 212-13 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
119. See id. at 172.
120. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
121. See, e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528
(holding that a municipality was not immune from federal minimum wage pro-
visions).
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Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985."2 The Act provided
that if states did not wish to regulate low level waste in ac-
cordance with federal regulations, they must take title to the
waste and become liable for all damages suffered as a result
of failing to regulate. 12 The court held that this provision was
unconstitutional because states were given a choice between
two options, either of which standing alone would be uncon-
stitutional.1 4 The court noted that "whether one views the
take title provision as lying outside Congress' enumerated
powers, or as infringing upon the core of state sovereignty re-
served by the Tenth Amendment, the provision is inconsistent
with the federal structure of our Government established by
the Constitution."12 '
In Printz v. United States the Court examined interim
provisions of the Brady Act. 126 The provisions of the Act re-
quired local law enforcement officials to participate in the
administration of the Act. 127 When examining the constitu-
tionality of the provisions, the Court turned to historical un-
derstanding and practice, the structure of the Constitution,
and the jurisprudence of the Court. 8 The Court recognized
the dual sovereignty of states and the Federal Government
under the Constitution.' 29 The Court ruled that federal laws
that violate principles of state sovereignty are not "proper" for
the purposes of the Supremacy Clause.' Accordingly, the
Court held that the Brady Act provisions were unconstitu-
tional.'3'
III. IDENTIFICATION OF THE LEGAL PROBLEM
After Oakland Cannabis, supporters of medical mari-
juana cannot use the defense of medical necessity."2 The Su-
preme Court, however, has not addressed constitutional chal-
122. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
123. See id. at 174-75.
124. See id. at 175.
125. Id. at 177.
126. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 933-35 (1997).
127. See id. at 904.
128. See id. at 905.
129. See id. at 918.
130. Id. at 924.
131. See id. at 935.
132. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
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lenges to the CSA."' Perhaps one of the most compelling
questions left unanswered by Oakland Cannabis is whether
Congress has the power to regulate intrastate medical mari-
juana use under the Commerce Clause. If Congress does not
have the power to regulate intrastate drug use, then the deci-
sion in Oakland Cannabis becomes irrelevant. If courts reject
Commerce Clause challenges to the CSA, then a question re-
mains as to whether other constitutional defenses, like a
Tenth Amendment challenge, may prove successful.
Oakland Cannabis also addressed the equity powers of
district courts.' The Court indicated that under certain cir-
cumstances, a district court need not issue an injunction
when violations of the CSA are found.' 5 An analysis of when
such discretion should be employed may help medical mari-
juana providers who face injunctions in the future.
IV. ANALYZING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE CSA UNDER
THE COMMERCE CLAUSE AND THE EQUITY POWER OF
DISTRICT COURTS
A. Is the CSA a Valid Expression of Congress's Commerce
Power?
Current Commerce Clause analysis begins with an in-
quiry into whether the regulated activity deals with economic
activity or violent intrastate crime.' If the CSA is merely a
regulation covering intrastate violent crime, Lopez and its
progeny dictate its demise. Obvious connections exist be-
tween violent crime and drugs, and the prohibition against
using illicit drugs stems largely from the belief that use of
drug§ leads to violent behavior.3 7 The CSA also recognizes
that the transfer of drugs, both illicit and legally controlled, is
at least indirectly a commercial endeavor. The scheduling
133. See supra note 40.
134. See supra Part II.A.4.
135. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
136. See supra note 68-70 and accompanying text.
137. See Deborah W. Denno, When Bad Things Happen to Good Intentions:
The Development and Demise of a Task Force Examining the Drugs-Violence In-
terrelationship, 63 ALB. L. REV. 749, 765 (2000) ("Most experts agree there is
some type of relationship between drugs and violence, but significant issues
concerning its causality, direction, form, magnitude and importance still must
be determined.").
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system of the CSA provides support for this proposition." 8
When a drug is placed on Schedules II through V, doctors are
able to prescribe these drugs to qualifying patients."9 Due to
the economic nature of these transactions, the provisions of
the CSA that regulate a doctor's ability to prescribe drugs are
unaffected by the Lopez and Morrison decisions since they fall
within Lopez's second category of "things" in interstate com-
merce. 14
0
Schedule I drugs cannot be prescribed by a doctor and
have been determined by Congress to have no currently ac-
cepted medical use.14' Individuals may possess or ingest these
drugs only in strictly controlled environments approved by
the federal government. 4' The government's prohibition
against the use and distribution of Schedule I drugs is actu-
ally more appealing to the litigant seeking to challenge Con-
gress's authority to enact the CSA under the Commerce
Clause. By classifying drugs in Schedule I, the government
takes those drugs out of legitimate interstate commerce and
ironically makes the classification of those drugs more vul-
nerable to a Commerce Clause challenge because the regula-
tion becomes a purely criminal affair as opposed to a garden-
variety regulation of a thing in interstate commerce. It is im-
portant to note that the Attorney General can both move a
drug from one schedule to another, and remove a drug from
any schedule entirely.' 4' This means that overnight the At-
torney General can transform an illicit drug from something
arguably not involved in interstate commerce into a thing un-
questionably in interstate commerce simply by placing it on a
138. The scheduling scheme of the CSA deals largely with drugs sold tt the
corner pharmacy in every city in America. See 21 U.S.C. § 812 (2000). When it
comes to illicit drugs, the forfeiture statutes show that one of the concerns of the
government is that drug dealers are financially profiting from their crimes. See
id. § 881.
139. See id. § 812.
140. The Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") regulates over-the-counter
and prescription drugs as well as food, medical devices, biologics, animal feed,
cosmetics and radiation emitting devices. For more information on the FDA
generally, see the FDA Web site address http://www.fda.gov. Because these ex-
amples are all directly related to economic activity, the federal government has
authority to regulate in these areas.
141. See 21 U.S.C § 812(b)(1).
142. See id. § 823(f). For a fascinating story of a man, Robert Randall, whom
the federal government allows to use cannabis to medicate his glaucoma, see
ROBERT C. RANDALL, MARIJUANA Rx (1998).
143. See 21 U.S.C. § 811(a).
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less restrictive schedule. Those wishing to attack the consti-
tutionality of the CSA would have to argue that the Schedule
I provisions are severable from the CSA and are unconstitu-
tional, while the remainder of the regulatory scheme should
remain intact. 4 4  If such a challenge were successful, Con-
gress could then decide to regulate the prohibited drugs by
moving them to a less restrictive schedule, or it could choose
not to schedule at all and decisions regarding prohibition and
enforcement would be left to the states. 14' Although this idea
would be more attractive to a court than a request to declare
the whole act unconstitutional, it is still an uphill battle. The
remaining analysis of the constitutionality of the CSA and the
Commerce Clause in this comment is limited to Schedule I
drugs.
Before a court could determine that the CSA was not di-
rectly related to commercial activity and did not regulate the
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, the court would
first look for the presence of a jurisdictional element.146 The
court would not find one. Under the CSA, controlled sub-
stances that are grown and ingested in one's home and that
never enter the stream of commerce or cross state or even
county lines, let alone county lines, still fall within the scope
of the Act. 147 This fact lends credence to the argument that
Congress has exceeded its authority when enacting the CSA.
The court would also review the findings of Congress in
order to determine whether there was sufficient evidence to
show that the regulated activity had a substantial effect on
interstate commerce. In 1970, when Congress passed the
CSA, it included findings and declarations that linked the
CSA to interstate commerce:
144. See 21 U.S.C. § 901 ("If a provision of this Act is held invalid, all valid
provisions that are severable shall remain in effect.").
145. In theory, if Schedule I provisions were deemed unconstitutional, the
government could reschedule all Schedule I drugs to Schedule II and still im-
pose onerous conditions on distribution.
146. Many federal statutes impose a requirement that the regulated activity
have a sufficient nexus with interstate commerce as an element of the offense.
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 875 (prohibiting interstate extortion and threats); 18
U.S.C. § 922 (prohibiting unlicensed interstate firearms transfer); 18 U.S.C. §
1201 (making kidnapping a federal offense by crossing state lines).
147. Congress has declared that this category of drugs would be a distinct
minority. See 21 U.S.C. § 801(3) (noting that a major portion of the traffic in
illicit drugs flows through interstate and foreign commerce).
148. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
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(4) Local distribution and possession of controlled sub-
stances contribute to swelling the interstate traffic in such
substances.
(5) Controlled substances manufactured and distributed
intrastate cannot be differentiated from controlled sub-
stances manufactured and distributed interstate. Thus, it
is not feasible to distinguish, in terms of controls, between
controlled substances manufactured and distributed inter-
state and controlled substances manufactured and dis-
tributed intrastate.
(6) Federal control of the intrastate incidents of the traffic
in controlled substances is essential to the effective control
of the interstate incidents of such traffic. 49
In passing the CSA, Congress determined that since there is
no way to distinguish between drugs which are purely intra-
state in nature and those that are interstate, it should be
given the authority to regulate all drugs."' This dispenses
with the need for a jurisdictional element. Such an argument
would probably be suitable to withstand a Commerce Clause
challenge. In the Lopez decision, the Court noted that the
GFSZA "is not an essential part of a larger regulation of eco-
nomic activity, in which the regulatory scheme could be un-
dercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated.""' Chief
Justice Rehnquist may have had the CSA in mind when mak-
ing this distinction."' When dealing with large-scale eco-
nomic regulation, Congress has the power to regulate purely
intrastate economic activity if such regulation is essential to
larger regulatory needs."'
In addition, if the drug business can be construed as
commercial in nature, a litigant can use the aggregate effects
test announced in Wickard..4 to determine that prohibitions
on intrastate drug possession and distribution are a valid ex-
149. 21 U.S.C. § 801.
150. Indeed, with economic regulations in particular, the Supreme Court has
never held that a regulated activity must relate to interstate commerce in all
conceivable situations.
151. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995).
152. See United State v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 700 (Breyer, J., dissenting)(noting that the CSA provides an example of this type of Congressional regula-
tion).
153. Id.
154. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
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pression of Congress's commerce power.'55 Since traditional
rules of supply and demand apply even to illicit industries,
purely intrastate drug use affects drug markets nationwide.'
If a particular state is over-represented with intrastate drug
consumption, then drug suppliers need to look to other states
to peddle their wares. When a customer base cannot fulfill its
demand via local markets, then drug dealers from other
states will fill the demand gap.
Although supporters of medical cannabis would correctly
point out that they are not selling drugs, but rather dispens-
ing needed medicine to sick and dying patients, the same re-
sult would be reached regardless of the fact that a buyer-
seller relationship does not exist. By going to a cannabis club
to receive marijuana, patients are not buying cannabis on the
interstate black market.157 This inaction affects the nation-
wide market for drugs. Although Morrison and Lopez seem to
indicate an increased hostility to the commerce power of Con-
gress, these cases address only non-economic, violent crime. 15
When dealing with drugs, the issues presented are at least
partially economic and many of the pre-Lopez rules still ap-
ply. A finding that the CSA exceeds Congress's Commerce
Power would require a significant expansion of the Commerce
Clause precedent.
Apart from the legal arguments that the government
would employ to defend the CSA from a Commerce Clause at-
tack, the disruption alone that would result if the Supreme
Court found the CSA unconstitutional would probably be
enough to prevent the Supreme Court from doing so. Unlike
the provisions in Morrison and Lopez, the CSA has been on
the books for over thirty years. '  In fact, the Federal Gov-
ernment has controlled the flow of marijuana for nearly sev-
155. The vast regulatory scheme of the CSA regulates not only illicit drugs,
but varying levels of controlled drugs. See 21 U.S.C. § 812. The argument that
the federal government has the ability to regulate prescription drugs, but not
the power to proscribe drugs, seems a difficult hurdle to cross.
156. The argument here is that the use of purely local drugs creates a local
market, which then in turn affects the larger market. See 21 U.S.C § 801(4)
(determining that local distribution and possession of controlled substances con-
tribute to swelling the interstate traffic in such substances).
157. In fact, a compelling reason to allow medical cannabis clubs is that sick
and dying people should not have to turn to the black market to obtain medi-
cine.
158. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
159. See 21 U.S.C § 801.
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enty years. 60 In addition to the sheer length of time that the
CSA has been on the books, an entire executive regulatory
industry has been set up to enforce it. 6' There are currently
9,209 Drug Enforcement Administration ("DEA") employees
and in fiscal year 2000, the DEA had a budget of 1.55 billion
dollars.'62 The DEA is so entrenched in government bureauc-
racy and the commitment to the war on drugs is so complete
(the total federal drug budget in 2000 was 17.8 billion)63 that
common sense alone dictates that a court would not likely
find any portion of the CSA unconstitutional.
One commentator noted that "the absence of a jurisdic-
tional hook does make it necessary to demonstrate explicitly
the connection between an individual defendant's marijuana
use and interstate commerce. If a defendant can demonstrate
that the drug in question was obtained locally and not
through interstate commerce, the Government's ability to
prosecute is weakened."'64 The lack of a jurisdictional ele-
ment, however, does not mean that a jurisdictional element is
infused into all federal statutes passed pursuant to the Com-
merce Clause; rather any attack on such a federal statute be-
comes a facial challenge to the law.' When it comes to drug
prosecutions, it is unlikely that a court will accept the defense
that possession of drugs is a purely local affair outside the
scope of Congress' commerce power.'66 As the Court in Can-
160. See Levay, supra note 3, at 701-05 (noting that the prohibitions on mari-
juana date back to 1934).
161. The Drug Enforcement Administration, which falls under the Depart-
ment of Justice, enforces the CSA. See DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN., U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, DEA GENEALOGY, at
http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/agency/genealogy.htm (last visited Jan. 8, 2001)'
162. See DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, DEA
STAFFING & BUDGET, at http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/agency/staffing.htm (last vis-
ited Jan. 8, 2001).
163. See id.
164. Newbern, supra note 6, at 1622.
165. The lack of a jurisdictional element in a federal criminal statute does
not create a burden on the prosecutor to show that the activity substantially af-
fects interstate commerce. Rather, courts have treated the lack of a jurisdic-
tional element as a facial attack on the law. See United States v. Haney, 264
F.3d 1161, 1166 (10th Cir. 2001) (noting that a Commerce Clause challenge to a
statute without a jurisdictional element is by its very nature facial); United
States v. Riddle, 2001 FED App. 0146P (6th Cir.), 249 F.3d 529, 539 ("Any as-
applied challenge is irrelevant since [the federal gambling statute] does not con-
tain a jurisdictional element and the prosecution need not put on evidence of a
particular connection with interstate commerce.").
166. This is particularly true in light of the growing popularity of metham-
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nabis Cultivators Club recognized:
To hold that the Controlled Substances Act is unconstitu-
tional as applied here would mean that in every action in
which a plaintiff seeks to prove a defendant violated a fed-
eral law, an element of every case-in-chief would be that
the defendant's specific conduct at issue... substantially
affected interstate commerce.167
Placing this standard on all plaintiffs and prosecutors
who seek to enforce a federal statute would prove too burden-
some. If a facial challenge to the CSA were successful, any
person would be free to cultivate or produce Schedule I drugs
at his home and consume them with immunity from federal
prosecution. Political realities dictate that this will not hap-
pen.
For this reason, when arguing that the Commerce Clause
limits the power of Congress to regulate medical marijuana,
supporters must differentiate between intrastate medical
cannabis consumption approved by a state and mere intra-
state recreational use. When a state like California passes a
law that decriminalizes the use and distribution of medical
marijuana for medical purposes, the intrastate nature of the
sanctioned use can be implied by examining the text of the
statute. In Proposition 215, California voters approved the
Compassionate Use Act of 1996, which exempts medical mari-
juana users and their primary caregivers from state criminal
prosecution.'68 One of the purposes of Proposition 215 is to
"ensure that seriously ill Californians have the right to obtain
and use marijuana for medical purposes."'69 The Compas-
sionate Use Act of 1996 is limited to matters of local concern
(the health and safety of California citizens) and applies to
only a limited subset of the population who can show that
they are seriously ill and have the recommendation of a phy-
phetamine, a drug, which can be produced in local laboratories and does not re-
quire plants from Central and South America for production. See DRUG
ENFORCEMENT ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, METHAMPHETAMINE, at
http://www.dea.gov/concern/meth.htm (last visited Jan. 8, 2001) (noting "the in-
creasing effort by local entrepreneurs, who operate on the periphery of the
methamphetamine market, to exploit the expanding demand for the drug by
producing smaller amounts of the drug in less complex laboratories").
167. United States v. Cannabis Cultivators Club, 5 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1098
(N.D. Cal. 1998).
168. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West Supp. 2002).
169. See id. § 11362.5(b)(1)(A).
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sician to use marijuana for medical purposes. "' Although this
argument provides a means to differentiate medical mari-
juana use from recreational use, this difference is probably
not significant enough to make a difference in the overall
Commerce Clause analysis because these factors do not di-
rectly create a limitation of Congress's power.
There exists, theoretically, a strong argument to support
the proposition that the CSA's Schedule I provisions are un-
constitutional: The CSA does not contain a jurisdictional ele-
ment; Congress did not make "findings" but rather made bald
proclamations regarding the relationship between drug pro-
hibition and interstate commerce; and the activity being regu-
lated is not purely economic, but rather criminal and there-
fore a matter of state concern.' 7 ' In reality, however, post-
Morrison appeals courts have been hostile, without exception,
towards Commerce Clause challenges to federal criminal stat-
utes."7 '
When a court is asked to declare the CSA unconstitu-
tional under the Commerce Clause, many of these legal issues
evaporate in the face of the realistic consequences of comply-
ing with such a request. In light of legal and political reali-
ties, lawyers should concede the validity of the CSA under
traditional Commerce Clause jurisprudence and move on to
other arguments in order to help those who need cannabis for
medical purposes.'73
170. See id.
171. See supra notes 137-49 and accompanying text.
172. See United States v. Faasse, 2001 FED App. 03240P (6th Cir.), 265 F.3d
475, 479 (recognizing that all eleven circuits have ruled that the Child Support
Recovery Act is a valid expression of Congress' power under the Commerce
Clause); United States v. Spinello, 265 F.3d 150, 157-58 (3d Cir. 2001) (rejecting
a Commerce Clause challenge to federal bank robbery statutes and noting that
other courts that addressed the issue have given it short shrift); United States
v. Haney, 264 F.3d 1161 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding that a federal ban on ma-
chineguns is constitutional and noting that all of the Courts of Appeals to ad-
dress the issue have found likewise); United States v. Gregg, 226 F.3d 253 (3d
Cir. 2000) (upholding the Freedom of Access to Clinics Act); United States v.
Taylor, 226 F.3d 593, 598-600 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that the federal carjack-
ing statute was constitutional under Lopez-Morrison and noting that nine other
circuits have agreed).
173. Indeed all courts that have addressed the issue have determined that
Lopez and its progeny do not affect the continuing constitutionality of the CSA.
See, e.g., United States v. Medina, 901 F. Supp. 59, 60 (D.P.R. 1995) ("[Tlhere is
no serious debate that Congress has authority to regulate drugs and narcotics
under the Commerce Clause"); Proyect v. United States, 101 F.3d 11, 14 (2d Cir.
1996) ("[W~e therefore join the Fourth Circuit and the District of Maine in re-
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B. Equitable Powers of District Courts
Section 882 of the CSA gives the federal government ju-
risdiction to seek civil injunctions for violations of the CSA.'74
Because medical cannabis users in California are seriously ill
and therefore do not make good criminal defendants," ' the
government is instead starting to seek injunctive relief pur-
suant to § 882 of the CSA against those who run cannabis
clubs.' 6  4.
Although § 882 of the CSA has been operative for more
than 30 years, its invocation is rare at best. 177 To a certain
degree, § 882 is surplusage with regard to Schedule I viola-
tors because the government has the option of criminally
prosecuting those who violate the CSA.'78 Common sense dic-
tates that the Government would only invoke the injunctive
powers of the court when violations do not warrant criminal
prosecution.7 9  For instance, the Government might seek an
injunction when a pharmacy fails to comply with the terms of
the CSA in its distribution of drugs placed on Schedules II
jecting the claim that... criminalizing the act of growing marijuana solely for
personal consumption, is unconstitutional"); United States v. Tisor, 96 F.3d 370,
375 (9th Cir. 1996) ("[O]ther courts reviewing the question of the continued vi-
ability of the Controlled Substances Act after Lopez have uniformly found the
statute to be constitutional").
174. See 21 U.S.C § 882 (2000).
175. Juries are more likely to engage in jury nullification when they are
sympathetic to the defendant. See generally Aaron T. Oliver, Note, Jury Nullifi-
catic;. Should the Type of Case Matter?, 6 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POLY 49 (1997).
176. See United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop., 121 S. Ct. 1711
(2001).
177. Prior to the recent actions of the federal government seeking to shut
down the cannabis clubs in Oakland Cannabis, the statute was only mentioned
in five reported cases. See United States v. Williams, 416 F. Supp. 611 (D.D.C.
1976); United States v. 121 Nostrand Ave., 760 F. Supp. 1015 (E.D.N.Y. 1991);
Kieffer v. United States, 550 F. Supp. 101 (E.D. Mich. 1982); Crocker v. United
States, 37 Fed. Cl. 191 (1997); Burley v. United States Drug Enforcement
Admin., 443 F. Supp. 619 (M.D. Tenn. 1977). Of these five, the government was
the plaintiff invoking § 882 in only the Williams and 121 Nostrand Ave. cases.
178. See 21 U.S.C. § 844.
179. When the government wants to prosecute someone for possessing or dis-
tributing illicit drugs, prosecutors almost always seek an indictment and then
try the defendant before a jury in a criminal case or reach a plea bargain. See
supra note 177 and accompanying text. Subsequent violations are not civilly
enjoined, but rather a defendant faces a harsher sentence in the criminal justice
system. The civil remedies of the CSA are not designed to be punitive. They
are concerned with the prevention of illegal profits from drug dealing. See, e.g.,
21 U.S.C. § 881 (providing for forfeiture of property used in connection with
drug selling).
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through V.18°
The Government almost exclusively files criminal
charges when dealing with Schedule I violations. However,
the Government has recently begun using § 882 to shut down
medical cannabis distribution clubs. 8' At the center of the
Government's effective use of § 882 is the argument that since
Congress has already balanced the equities regarding any use
of cannabis, an injunction is mandatory once a CSA violation
is found.8 In other words, Congress has divested the district
courts of equitable discretion. But the Supreme Court ruling
in Oakland Cannabis and other cases upon which the Court
relied dispel this notion. 3
In Williams, the Government obtained an injunction
against a pharmacist who failed to comply with provisions of
the CSA 84 In that case, the court noted that the practical
purpose of § 882 was to prevent businesses that engage in
unlawful practices from illegally profiting from lax distribu-
tion procedures.185 Since the CSA governs a wide range of
drugs, Congress wisely provided an enforcement mechanism
to enjoin unfair business practices that did not warrant
criminal prosecution.'
The 121 Nostrand Avenue opinion demonstrates that §
822 is unnecessary when dealing with Schedule I violations. 187
The lack of discussion regarding the injunction and the fact
that it was issued so abruptly in that case lend credence to
180. See United States v. Williams, 416 F. Supp. 611 (D.D.C. 1976).
181. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
182. "[Wlhen Congress invokes the Chancellor's conscience to further tran-
scendent legislative purposes, what is required is the principled appliciition of
standards consistent with those purposes ... ." Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,
422 U.S. 405, 417 (1975). "A district court cannot, for example, override Con-
gress' policy choice, articulated in a statute, as to what behavior should be pro-
hibited." United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop., 121 S. Ct. 1711,
1721 (2001).
183. See Oakland Cannabis,121 S. Ct. at 1720 ("[W]hen district courts are
properly acting as courts of equity, they have discretion unless a statute clearly
provides otherwise.").
184. See Williams, 416 F. Supp. at 614.
185. See id.
186. In Williams, such a mechanism worked perfectly. The defendant did
engage in some violations of the CSA, but he did not possess the moral culpabil-
ity of the average drug dealer. Instead of criminal prosecution, he was fined
and an injunction was put in place to prevent further unlawful activities. See
id.
187. See text accompanying notes 52-56.
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the argument that § 882 is indeed surplusage when dealing
with the vending of street drugs. The CSA is effective as a
means to enforce the laws regarding controlled substances
placed on Schedules II through V. The district court judge in
121 Nostrand Avenue probably did not expect to see the
United States back in his court seeking compliance if the de-
fendant violated the injunction. Although the court noted
that "the statute arguably provides for an injunction," it still
issued the injunction. 8 ' The court did not meaningfully con-
sider its decision to issue the injunction, if § 882 was only
"arguably" applicable. The court's discussion illustrates the
tension inherent in issuing prospective injunctive relief when
criminal penalties are available.
The CSA is a statutory scheme that allows for both
criminal prosecution and equitable remedies.'89 A line of Su-
preme Court cases support the proposition that the court
need not mechanically issue coextensive injunctive relief
whenever a statutory violation is found. 9 ' In fact, the equita-
ble discretion of the court to refrain from issuing an injunc-
tion remains unchanged.
In Hecht, the Supreme Court was presented with a stat-
ute that on its face took away the district court's ability to re-
fuse to issue an injunction in certain circumstances.' The
Supreme Court, however, ruled that the language in that
statute-that an injunction "shall be granted"-could not be
read to alter the discretion of the district court because the
relief sought was equitable and an intent to abrogate the eq-
uitable powers of the court was not demonstrated. 9' The
CSA, unlike the statute involved in Hecht, does not contain
mandatory or permissive language, but merely confers juris-
diction for equitable relief."'9
188. See United States v. 121 Nostrand Ave., 760 F. Supp. 1015, 1035
(E.D.N.Y. 1991).
189. See 21 U.S.C. § 844 (2000) (authorizing criminal penalties for possession
of controlled substances); 21 U.S.C. § 882 (authorizing civil injunctions for viola-
tions of the CSA).
190. See Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305 (1982); Hecht Co. v.
Bowles, 321 U.S. 321 (1944).
191. See Hecht, 321 U.S. at 321-22.
192. Id. at 328-29.
193. See 21 U.S.C. § 882(a) ("The district courts of the United States and all
courts exercising general jurisdiction in the territories and possessions of the
United States shall have jurisdiction in proceedings in accordance with the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure to enjoin violations of this title.").
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One could argue that in Hecht the court did not issue an
injunction only because the violations were technical and is-
suing the injunction would not further the policies behind the
statute since the violations had ceased.14 To a certain extent
such an argument conflates the actual balancing of the equi-
ties by the court and the power of the court to exercise its dis-
cretion to balance in the first place. The Hecht court deter-
mined that the district court had the power to balance the
equities, even in spite of the statute, and the results of the
balancing yielded a decision to refrain from issuing an injunc-
tion. 95 The actual balancing will differ from case to case, but
the principle to be taken from Hecht is clear. Even when
faced with a statute that requires an injunction, an injunction
is never mandatory absent a clear command from Congress to
limit the equity powers of the Court."6 As the Supreme Court
in Hecht noted, "The essence of equity jurisdiction has been
the power of the Chancellor to do equity and to mould each
decree to the necessities of the particular case. Flexibility
rather than rigidity has distinguished it.'
19 7
The reasoning of Hecht bolsters the argument that the
CSA does not divest the district court's authority to use its
equity powers to either refrain entirely from issuing an in-
junction or to issue an injunction with exemptions."' The Su-
preme Court stated that "[uinless a statute in so many words,
or by a necessary and inescapable inference, restricts the
court's jurisdiction in equity, the full scope of that jurisdiction
is to be recognized and applied." ' Since the CSA may be en-
forced through other remedies, such as criminal prosecution,
the CSA cannot be construed as including a "necessary and
inescapable reference" that the court's equity authority is
194. See Hecht, 321 U.S. at 325.
195. See id. at 330.
196. The particular facts of Hecht are exceedingly unique, as the title of the
statute in question, Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, might suggest. But
the broad pronouncement of Hecht regarding the equity powers of the court
when faced with a statutory injunction remains vital to this day. See supra note
114 and accompanying text. Perhaps the Hecht decision is even more relevant
today, since there are so many more federal laws on the books than there were
in 1944.
197. Hecht, 321 U.S. at 329.
198. See United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop., 121 S. Ct. 1711,
1720 (2001) ("[Wlhen district courts are properly acting as courts of equity, they
have discretion unless a statute clearly provides otherwise.").




Under the CSA, the government is not faced with the
TVA v. Hill dilemma."' In TVA, the only way for the district
court to ensure compliance with the federal statute was to is-
sue an injunction.2"' In the context of the CSA, if an injunc-
tion is not granted at all, or is not granted as broadly as the
Government would like, the Government can simply prose-
cute the violators in a criminal court.02 TVA provides a per-
fect example of when an injunction should be mandatory:
when such relief is the only way to remedy the statutory vio-
lation. The CSA does not fit that mold.
The Oakland Cannabis Court recognized that the equita-
ble powers of district courts are not divested by the CSA.2°'
Writing for the majority, Justice Thomas chose to engage in a
pronouncement of how equitable discretion operates in the
context of § 882 injunction requests:
[T]he mere fact that the District Court had discretion does
not suggest that the District Court, when evaluating the
motion to modify the injunction, could consider any and all
factors that might relate to the public interest or the con-
veniences of the parties, including the medical needs of
the Cooperative's patients .... [W]hen a court of equity
exercises its discretion, it may not consider the advan-
tages and disadvantages of non-enforcement of the stat-
ute, but only the advantages and disadvantages of 'em-
ploying the extraordinary remedy of injunction,' over the




Although the Court in Hecht eloquently summarized the
power of the equity court in a much broader fashion,20 ' Justice
Thomas' opinion in Oakland Cannabis still leaves open an
200. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
201. The court speaks of an "irreconcilable conflict" between building the
dam and enforcing the Endangered Species Act. Id. at 193.
202. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
203. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
204. United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop., 121 S. Ct. 1711,
1721-22 (2001) (citation omitted).
205. The Court noted:
The qualities of mercy and practicality have made equity the instru-
ment for nice adjustment and reconciliation between the public interest
and private needs as well as between competing private claims. We do
not believe that such a major departure from that long tradition as is
here proposed should be lightly implied.
Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329-30 (1944).
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argument that injunctions against medical marijuana provid-
ers are a less favorable method of enforcement than criminal
prosecution.
When a criminal defendant is charged with a federal
crime, he is guaranteed the right to a twelve-person jury, and
unanimity among the jurors is required for a conviction.2 °6
This right to a jury trial in a criminal case is obviously not
subject to summary judgment proceedings.2"7 Under § 882,
however, a person facing a contempt charge for violating an
injunction faces the possibility of summary judgment and a
six-person jury.0 8 Obviously, when a court grants summary
judgment, any hope for jury nullification is lost.209 When the
Government brings a § 882 action, prosecutors make a tacti-
cal decision not to criminally prosecute the offender. 2" This
decision can lead to a diminished role for the jury. This is
particularly troubling in California where the people have ex-
pressed an interest in permitting medical marijuana use.2 1 1
206. See United States v. Smedes, 760 F.2d 109, 113 (6th Cir. 1985) (noting
that a federal criminal defendant cannot waive the right to unanimity); FED. R.
CRIM. P. 23(b) (preserving the right to a twelve-person jury).
207. See United States v. Gulla, 833 F. Supp. 274, 284 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)
("[Tihe Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure contain no provision for a motion
for summary judgment or its equivalent [in a criminal trial].").
208. See 21 U.S.C. § 882(b) (2000) ("In the case of an alleged violation of an
injunction or restraining order issued under this section, trial shall, upon de-
mand of the accused, be by a jury in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure."). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow six persons juries and
summary judgment. See Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149 (1973) (holding that a
local rule providing for a jury of six in civil cases satisfied the Seventh Amend-
ment's guarantee of trial by jury); FED. R. Civ. P. 56 (allowing for summary
judgment in civil cases). For a compelling defense of the twelve person jury, see
Richard S. Arnold, Trial By Jury: The Constitutional Right To A Jury Of Twelve
In Civil Trials, 22 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1 (1992).
209. Although it is difficult to speculate about the Government's motives
when bringing a § 882 injunction instead of a criminal prosecution, civil courts
clearly provide procedural advantages to the government. One possible advan-
tage is not having to contend with jury nullification. See supra note 175. When
the government prosecutes people suffering from AIDS and cancer, such an ad-
vantage cannot be understated.
210. See United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop, 190 F.3d
1109,1114 (9th Cir. 1999) ("The government did not need to get an injunction to
enforce the federal marijuana laws. If it wanted to, it could have proceeded in
the usual way, by arresting and prosecuting those it believed had committed a
crime.").
211. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West Supp. 2002).
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V. PROPOSAL, INVOKING THE COURTS OF EQUITY & REVIVING
THE TENTH AMENDMENT
As discussed above, the Federal Government's response
to increased state sanctioning of medical cannabis has taken
three forms: (1) criminally prosecuting medical cannabis us-
ers and their providers; (2) seeking civil injunctions to pre-
vent clubs from distributing cannabis; and (3) threatening
sanctions against doctors who recommend cannabis to their
patients.212 The Federal Government's attempts to threaten
doctors have been largely unsuccessful.21 For that reason,
this proposal focuses on criminal prosecutions and civil in-
junctions. The first part of this proposal advocates invoking
equitable principles to protect medical marijuana users and
caregivers when the government seeks civil injunctions to
shut down cannabis clubs.214 The second part of this proposal
contends that in certain circumstances defendants should use
the Tenth amendment to protect themselves when faced with
federal criminal prosecution for using and distributing medi-
cal marijuana."'
A. Civil Injunctions Against Medical Marijuana
Distribution
After Oakland Cannabis, when the government seeks to
enjoin distribution of medical cannabis, defendants can still
argue the deficiencies of a civil injunction as compared with
the remedy of criminal prosecution, including the deprivation
of the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, the possibility of
summary adjudication, the denial of a privilege against self-
incrimination and the denial of a presumption of innocence. 16
A defendant can argue that a jury of one's peers is the best
method to resolve an evolving issue of law with unique states'
rights implications.
An equity court need not allow injustice simply because
the letter of the law fails to address the particular needs of
certain situations. By forcing the Government to bring crimi-
nal actions against very sick people and their caregivers, a le-
212. See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text.
213. See Conant v. McCaffrey, No. C 97-00139 WHA, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
13024, at *48 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 2000).
214. See infra Part V.
215. See supra Part V.B.
216. See supra notes 207-11 and accompanying text.
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gitimate hope exists that prosecutorial discretion and com-
passion will enter the equation. If the Government chooses to
criminally prosecute these people, at least the possibility of
jury nullification remains.217
The CSA is not flexible enough to consider the hardship
imposed upon the many people deprived of cannabis as a
medicine. It does not factor in their suffering, nor does it con-
template that dying people may have to resort to a dangerous
black market to obtain this medicine. In short, a federal
criminal statute that prohibits distribution of cannabis under
all circumstances is unduly harsh. A court sitting in equity
can refrain from issuing an incompassionate and rigid rem-
edy. If a court finds that an injunction is not in fact the pref-
erable enforcement mechanism, the door remains open for
continued distribution of medical marijuana.
B. Reviving the Tenth Amendment
Under current Commerce Clause jurisprudence, it is
highly unlikely that any court will rule that Congress has ex-
ceeded its authority to enact the CSA.21" But allowing the
Federal Government to invade the democratically expressed
will of the states regarding health and safety issues appears
overbearing, especially since purely intrastate criminal law
has traditionally been left to the determination of the
states."9 The underlying principles of the recent Commerce
Clause cases and those cases that have been respectful to
state sovereignty can provide the support needed to fashion a
new argument allowing for continued state-sponsored medical
marijuana distribution.
When California voters passed Proposition 215, they ex-
pressed their shared values regarding medical marijuana.22
Deborah Jones Merrit stated the benefits of respecting such
an expression of these values:
[A] major advantage of federalism lies in the ability of
state and local governments to draw citizens into the po-
217. See supra note 175.
218. See supra Part IV.
219. See United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. 32, 34 (1812) ("Certain
implied powers must necessarily result to [federal] Courts of justice from the
nature of their institution. But jurisdiction of crimes against the state is not
among those powers.").
220. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West Supp. 2002).
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litical process. The greater accessibility and smaller scale
of local government allows individuals to participate ac-
tively in governmental decision-making. This participa-
tion, in turn, provides myriad benefits: it trains citizens in
the techniques of democracy, fosters accountability among
elected representatives, and enhances voter confidence in
the democratic process. For these reasons, the opportu-
nity to participate personally in governmental decision-
making is an important part of the democratic process.
The participation of California voters in the democratic proc-
ess should not be taken lightly. But finding constitutional
protection for this participation in the medical marijuana de-
bate may be difficult in light of the Supremacy Clause22 and
decisions characterizing the Tenth Amendment as a nullity or
a mere truism."'
In New York v. United States, however, the Supreme
Court held that a federal provision violated the Tenth
Amendment because it forced the state of New York to choose
between either taking title to nuclear waste or regulating the
waste in accordance with federal law.224  The Federal Gov-
ernment lacked the power to impose either of these conditions
independently, and therefore the Government lacked the au-
thority to impose the choice.225 New York v. United States
stands for the proposition that the Federal Government can-
not force state legislatures to act in a specified manner. Simi-
larly, in Printz v. United States, the Supreme Court declared
unconstitutional a federal law that required state law en-
forcement officers to participate in regulating gun transfers. 6
The Printz ruling ensures that the Federal Government can-
not make an end-run around New York v. United States by
commandeering state executive officials to enforce federal
law.
After New York v. United States and Printz, the Federal
Government is prohibited from forcing states to enforce fed-
221. Deborah Jones Merrit, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Fed-
eralism for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 7-8 (1988).
222. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
223. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (re-
jecting a Tenth Amendment challenge to a law, noting that states are protected
by the federal structure which gives each state representation in Congress).
224. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 175-77 (1992).
225. See id.
226. See United States v. Printz, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997).
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eral laws. With these principles in mind, this comment pro-
poses the following hypothesis: Congress exceeds its Com-
merce power when it invades the traditional province of the
States to regulate health and safety by criminalizing behavior
which a state explicitly permits and participates in.27 This
hypothesis is effective only when the following four conditions
are present.
227. Terrence Messonnier explains that:
To the extent the acts passed in the thirty years following the framing
and ratification of the Constitution can be used to interpret the mean-
ing of the Constitution, or the Framers' understanding of the meaning
of the Constitution, these acts indicate that the constitution was meant
to confer only an extremely limited power over criminal law. The re-
maining power over criminal law belonged to the states.
Terrence M. Messonnier, Neo-Federalism, Popular Sovereignty, and the Crimi-
nal Law, 29 AKRON L. REV. 549, 558-59 (1996).
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1. The Federal Law Must Lack an Express
Jurisdictional Element
Since Congress has the power to regulate things in inter-
state commerce, the presence of a jurisdictional element in-
creases the likelihood of facial constitutional compliance. The
CSA contains no jurisdictional element.
2. The Conduct at Issue Must Not Directly Relate to
Commercial Activity or Involve the Channels or
Instrumentalities of Interstate Commerce
The power of the federal government to regulate commer-
cial activity in a highly inter-connected Union remains un-
touched by a stricter view of the Commerce Clause. Accord-
ingly, if the regulated activity is directly related to
commercial enterprise, or in any manner regulates the chan-
nels or instrumentalities of interstate commerce, a contrary
state law would not affect the validity of the federal statute.
The CSA, is not directly economic in nature since it prohibits
mere possession and transfer of drugs without the exchange
of money.
3. The State Statute Must Expressly Permit the Activity
Forbidden by the Federal Criminal Statute
The manifest expression of a state regarding issues tradi-
tionally left to the states, like criminal statutes, would trigger
Tenth Amendment review. The CSA conflicts with Proposi-
tion 215 because the affirmative permission granted by the
California statute to use marijuana for medical purposes is
directly at odds with the CSA's all-encompassing prohibitions
on possession and distribution of marijuana.
4. The State Must Actively Participate in the Activity
Forbidden by the Federal Statute
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Although no state currently distributes medical mari-
juana, such a plan remains a possibility.228 If a state were to
distribute medical marijuana, unique states-rights issues
would be present if the Federal Government attempted to en-
join such distribution. If the State of California decided to ac-
tively distribute marijuana pursuant to Proposition 215, the
concerns of New York v. United States and Printz would come
to the forefront. Rather than hoping for voluntary participa-
tion by the state or local government, future proposition
drafters should require state participation.
If the four conditions were met, the federal statute would
not be operative as applied to the activity permitted by the
particular state law in question. Under this analysis, the
federal statute would be deemed unconstitutional only as ap-
plied to the state-sanctioned activity. As to states that have
not passed legislation expressly permitting the federally pro-
hibited behavior or have not actively participated in the be-
havior, the federal law would remain operative.
Under this proposal, Congress is still given wide latitude
to pass laws pursuant to the Commerce Clause, however this
latitude is checked by the will of the States. The federal law
remains the supreme law of the land to the extent it does not
usurp the Tenth Amendment rights of the States to pass laws
regarding public health and safety and participate in their
administration. More importantly, the political realities of
this analysis would be more palatable to courts since it does
not seek to declare all prohibitions on personal intrastate
drug use unconstitutional. Rather, it provides a narrow
sphere that is protected from government interference. If a
court presented with a federal medical marijuana prosecution
recognized this proposal, the CSA could not be used to prose-
cute those acting in compliance with state laws permitting
the use of medical marijuana.
VI. CONCLUSION
A traditional challenge to the Commerce Clause power of
228. See United States v. Cannabis Cultivators Club, 5 F. Supp. 2d 1086,
1105-06 (N.D. Cal. 1998) ("[Tjhe San Francisco District Attorney has raised the
issue of possible local governmental distribution of medical marijuana .... The
Court recognizes that local governmental distribution of medical marijuana to




Congress when enacting the CSA would likely be unsuccess-
ful because of legal precedent and political realities.229 When
the Government employs § 882 in an effort to enjoin individu-
als from distributing medical cannabis, the equity power of
the court is not divested. District courts need not issue an in-
junction against medical cannabis distribution if they deter-
mine that injunctive relief is not a preferable method of en-
forcement. When faced with criminal prosecutions under the
CSA, in certain circumstances courts should recognize the
Tenth Amendment as a limit to Congress' Commerce Clause
power. When a state expressly permits behavior prohibited
by a federal criminal statute unrelated to purely economic
concerns, and actively participates in that behavior, the state
statute should remain operative.
229. See supra Part IV.
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